Abstract
Kidnapping in Iraq is primarily for economic or political reasons. It became widespread in the aftermath of the US invasion in Iraq in March 2003 and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. The invasion resulted to a weaker central government that allowed organized crimes to thrive. Various solutions have been offered to curb the rampant abduction cases in Iraq. These include the establishment of a central authority to enact stringent laws against organized crime, the deprivation of publicity to abduction cases, tackling the socio-economic inequalities, and establishment of security agencies purposely to fight kidnapping. However, these strategies fail to recognize the importance of a coordinated approach to fighting organized crime. This paper proposes a solution that involves a closer cooperation between the government’s security apparatus, the foreign military in Iraq and the NGOs.
Introduction
Kidnapping is the unlawful abduction for ransom that has a profound psychological and economic burden on the victims of such a crime. In Iraq, kidnapping is a highly profitable industry much like oil and petroleum smuggling, and it involves a form of warfare waged by the weak against the rich and powerful. Sometimes, it ends in tragedy or death, and other times the victims are released after payment of ransom. Kidnapping demeans the victims while empowering those responsible for this crime. In Iraq, kidnapping of foreigners attracts international attention, while kidnapping of Iraqis occurs in obscurity. This makes it difficult to determine the scale and scope of the crime in Iraq. Thus, the determination of kidnapping trends in Iraq is affected by under-reporting of kidnapping cases and limited media coverage of such incidences (Boyle, 2010 Pp. 242).
Nevertheless, the allegation that the rate of kidnapping is high is indisputable especially in the post-Hussein Iraq. It is a fast “growing industry” and a highly profitable activity for organized gangs, local insurgent groups, and jihad terrorists (CIT). Although there have been extensive kidnapping incidents in Iraq and the Middle East, the invasion of the U.S. in Iraq in March 2003 resulted to an upsurge of the problem following the disorder and chaos created by the invasion. The absence of legitimate government; the inadequacies of law enforcement including corruption, and infiltration of the police; a sense of lawlessness involving the public as well as the vulnerability of the target population also contributed to this problem.
Eliminating kidnapping in Iraq calls for cooperation between governments and locals in identifying the organized gangs; raising public awareness on ways to prevent being kidnapped and advising the public to be armed with small weapons such as pepper sprays or stun guns at all times. Preventing kidnapping in Iraq requires closer cooperation between the law enforcement, the military units, and the NGOs.
Presentation of the Problem
In Iraq, kidnapping was traditionally connected to tribal rivalries, business disputes and to some extent, forced marriages. On many instances, kidnappings are “used to solve longstanding commercial and tribal conflicts,” and as such appear more as an extension of business negotiations (Andreas, 2008, p. 79). However, since 2003, following the U.S. invasion in Iraq, kidnappings are primarily of two types: political and economic kidnapping (Fact Sheet, 2008). Economic kidnapping is the most common type in of kidnapping in the country and is primarily for profit. Initially, it targeted vulnerable Iraqis especially from wealthy families and involved abduction, ransom payment and release. In some cases, the kidnappings were performed for profit, and the victim told to relocate from Iraq or risk death. This form of kidnappings was prevalent among foreign doctors, researchers and scientists working in Iraq (Fact Sheet, 2008).
In Iraq, most kidnapping cases result to death of the victim. In these cases, the motive is not profit, but revenge or sectarian cleansing (Andreas, 2008, p. 81). Several cases of mass kidnappings have been reported often followed by the discovery of mass graves. Citizens have also been abducted in the streets and transferred to different locations, tortured, killed, and their bodies disposed off in a mass grave or at the abduction site. This demonstrates the extent of the committer’s impunity and disrespect for the law. This appears to be an effective sectarian cleansing method compared to mass shooting of victims. In some cases, some law enforcement officers are perpetrators of obvious killing of the citizens. Politically motivated kidnappings target foreigners and Iraqis, as well. It is conventionally an intimidation strategy: the victims are threatened and told to relocate from Iraq after their release. Kidnapping is also a tactic used to protect oil smuggling by criminal gangs. Anti-corruption officers involved in enforcement of anti-graft laws are often victims of this form of abduction (Ballentine & Nitzschke, 2009).
Conventionally, kidnapping is a useful weapon for terrorist groups and insurgents. They help to spread fear (through videotaped executions of victims), as a way of putting pressure against the government for political reasons (for instance, the withdrawal of solders from Iraq) and they highlight the government’s inability to promote the rule of law in Iraq. In some respects, kidnapping in Iraq occurs at an unprecedented level, with one commentary asserting that kidnapping in Iraq has been “made into a system and used as both a political and military weapon in Iraq” (Fact Sheet, 2008). The U.S. invasion in 2003 followed by the collapse of central government in Iraq created anarchy and thus, appropriate conditions for kidnapping industry to thrive. Nevertheless, before the U.S. intervention, the American State Department had issued a traveling advisory to its citizens concerning the risk of being kidnapped in Iraq (Fact Sheet, 2008). After the invasion, the country relapsed to the continuity of the Ba’athist era, where “kidnappings are for sexual purposes or ransom-both of which were formalized weapons of the Ba’athist security apparatus” (Fact Sheet, 2008). Thus, kidnappings in Iraq has become an “institutionalized criminal operation” (2005, p. 41) perpetrated by past regime elements.
Presentation of the Proposed Solution
Since the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, kidnapping has been linked to state weakness, lack of economic opportunities, the collapse of moral norms, and the emergence of multiple insurgent groups with competing interests. Many solutions have been proposed to combat kidnapping. Among them is the establishment of a stable central government to enact stringent laws on kidnapping and abduction to curb money laundering, and make it difficult for abductors to invest or spend ransom earnings. Other solutions proposed include the deprivation of publicity to kidnappers, non-payment of ransom, the establishment of distinct security agencies to combat kidnapping, and addressing the social inequalities in Iraq including unemployment (Boyle, 2010, p. 336). The hunt and recovery of guns in private hands, expansion of the human capacity and strengthening the community regulations against kidnapping are other solutions proposed.
The solution proposed in this research involves a closer cooperation between the law enforcement and the military units in intelligence gathering, enacting laws and fighting corruption. As Cordesman states, placing emphasis on the root cause of the problem would significantly contribute to planning and execution of anti-abduction activities (2006, p. 186). Normally, the U.S. military operating in Iraq considers cases of abduction to be under the jurisdiction of law enforcement departments, which in Iraq’s context, is highly infiltrated. Thus, the department is seen to be incompetent and lacks the smarts to tackle the crime. For effective elimination of this crime there should be fruitful cooperation between the US military and the local agencies. The cooperation will ensure that the military after-action reports and other strategies are implemented within the law enforcement department to enhance its efficiency (Cordesman, 2006, p. 191). Unfortunately, the cooperation between the two is low. The recent initiatives by the U.S. Department of Justice including the Law and Order Task force can be used to foster the cooperation between the two departments.
The cooperation can be in terms of training of Iraq police officers and intelligence sharing. Since the military intelligence is limited because of less understanding of the Iraq culture, political and social networks and tribal relationships, the integration of the military intelligence into the law enforcement to identify the financiers and leaders of the insurgents involved in kidnappings. Thus, a coordinated approach can be an effective strategy for combating kidnapping in Iraq.
Summary and Rebuttal of Opposing Views
Although the integration of the military intelligence with law enforcement presents a viable solution to the problem of kidnapping, some commentators hold different views. Some opponents of this form of intervention argue that are of the idea that the elimination of kidnaping should be based on the root causes of the problem. Andreas, (2008) notes that kidnapping in Iraq traces its origin from the terrorist groups that transformed after realizing that it is a good method for instilling mass panic. Thus, various terror groups have continuously extended the crime to an extent that hostages are traded among the extremist groups. However, one is keen to note that once the kidnappers get a hostage, they run to the media where they show their victims in different forms, in some cases undergoing brutal murder. Unfortunately this message is amplified by the international media especially where the hostage was an international citizen tus making the abductors get the much needed publicity. To combat the crime, the publicity given to such scenarios should be avoided as they help to advance the terror group’s main agenda of instilling mass fear and exhorting ransoms. Another possible solution to ensure that kidnapping cases in Iraq are managed is to ensure that terror groups and other extremes groups should also be crashed to ensure that they lack the organization needed to organize successful abductions.
Justification Section
Militias and warlords often emerge to offer security services to citizens, which the government has failed to give. As such, they act as a proxy for the government but their activities affect the legitimacy of the state. In Iraq, the post-conflict situation led to the emergence of many organized gangs involved in the abduction. From this perspective, if the state fails to provide adequate security to its citizens, then non-state agents including the organized gangs will fill the void. Thus, the law enforcement agencies should collaborate with the military to assure the security of the citizenry.
At the same time, it is essential that the government to identify the informal activities that are illegal and establish appropriate coping strategies on the same. In addition, through intelligence sharing, the government can identify the criminal gangs linked with insurgency or illegal resource generation. Although abductions may be due to conflict or economic reasons, through intelligence sharing, the actual gangs and their motives can be sorted out and dealt with separately. To achieve this, the state encourages informal but legal economic activities to combat criminal or conflict economy.
Key to this strategy is the prevention of the recruitment by the insurgent and criminal groups. Sharing of intelligence can play a pivotal role here. In addition, the state should prioritize the informal economy through the establishment of informal employment activities for the unemployed youth, who are at risk of joining the insurgent organizations that offer them employment. It is also noteworthy that the state considers economic status as the social determinant for the existence of the kidnapping gangs.
As Mills and McNamee state, “the principal challenge to post-peace building activities is ensuring political and economic stability” (2007, Para. 6). Indeed, economic recovery, in the short run, serves to neutralize political gangs or insurgents; increases government support in both the grass roots and urban areas
Another priority, in the collaboration between the law enforcement and the military, should be increasing the capacity to change the factors that influence kidnappings in post-war situations. Organized gangs are usually vibrant under these circumstances. Ballentine and Nitzschke argue that collaboration between the NGOs and donor agencies participating in peace building, in post-conflict situations, should be proactive in addressing shadow economy involving the organized criminal gangs (2009, p. 19). The reconstruction strategies should incorporate incentives to attract individuals involved in organized crime to engage in legal economic activities. Thus, the state should enhance the provision of security, social services and employment in order to free the citizens from abduction-dependency and dismantle mafia structures. To achieve this, collaboration between the military and the law enforcement is decisive with regard to intelligence sharing and police training.
NGOs can also play a role in resolving the kidnapping problem in Iraq. Often, the NGOs work independent of the military with less information sharing between the two. However, a close relationship between the military and the NGOs is vital in fighting organized gangs in Iraq. However, the NGOs sometimes fail to give information to military intelligence or give different perspectives regarding organized crime. For instance, women NGOs can track the abduction and illegal trade of girls and share this information with the military or the law enforcement. In situations such as Iraq, intelligence can take a broad approach; it should involve information collection and assessment in a collaborative manner.
This means that the efforts to combat kidnapping should be given priority over that of fighting organized gangs. In some instances, fighting organized gangs can be counterproductive; it results to conflicts that affect the society and has a spillover effect on other aspects of the society. However, ultimately, the efforts to combat kidnapping perpetrated by organized gangs requires concerted efforts between the law enforcement, the US military, and the different non-governmental agencies involved in peace-building activities, in Iraq especially with regard to intelligence gathering. Any strategy that fails to combine these agencies in the management of post-conflict situations such as in Iraq is incomplete and thus likely to fail.
Conclusion
Kidnapping is a wide spread problem especially because it involves organized criminal gangs. Many solutions have been proposed to combat abductions in Iraq including non-payment of ransom to secure the release of hostages, arming the public and addressing the social and economic inequalities. However, given that kidnappings in Iraq, which is strongly embedded in the society, involves organized gangs, thus the most essential solutions in my opinion to cure this conflict is the cooperation between the NGOs, the law enforcement, and the peacekeeping military. Intelligence sharing between these agencies can help identify and root out organized criminal gangs involved in kidnapping.